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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Amanda Leann Skogen appeals from the judgment entered upon her
guilty plea to voluntary manslaughter.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Law enforcement responded to a report that three-year-old C.J. was
unresponsive. (R., Vol. I, p.12.) When law enforcement arrived, Skogen, who
was babysitting C.J., reported that C.J. "suddenly went limp and unconscious
after urinating in his pants."

(Id.)

Skogen also claimed that C.J. had been

complaining of a headache, seemed very tired, and had vomited that day, and he
may have had the flu the previous week. (Id.) At the hospital, medical personnel
determined C.J. had suffered two skull factures with internal bleeding and he was
transported by air for immediate surgery. (R., Vol. I, pp.13, 18.) C.J. also had
"multiple small bruises on this cheeks and jaw area" that "looked like they were
caused by fingers," "bruising on his right ear as if someone had pulled on it as
well as brownish bruises on his chest," and a "healing black eye on his right eye."
(R., Vol. I, p.18.)
During a subsequent interview, Skogen denied knowledge of how C.J.
fractured his skull and agreed to take a polygraph. (R., Vol. I, pp.19-24.) Skogen
failed the polygraph.

(R., Vol. I, p.31.)

When confronted with the polygraph

results, Skogen initially continued to deny knowledge of how C.J. was injured, but
eventually admitted she "pushed him."

(R., Vol. I, p.33.)

Skogen said she

pushed C.J. because she was angry with him for wetting his pants and getting it
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on her and her couch. (Id.) When Skogen pushed C.J.,
head on the floor.
happened.

back and hit his

(Id.) Skogen said she heard a "cracking noise" when this

(R., Vol. I, pp.33-34.) Skogen claimed she tried to revive C.J. by

splashing water on his face and, when that was unsuccessful, she called 911.
(R., Vol. I, p.34.)

C.J. later died from his head injuries. (R., Vol. I, p.36.) The state charged
Skogen with first-degree murder. (R., Vol. I, p.43.) After the preliminary hearing,
the court declined to bind Skogen over on the charged offense and instead
bound her over on involuntary manslaughter. (P.H. Tr., Vol. 2, p.298, Ls.16-25;
p.299, Ls.14-15.) The state filed a motion to dismiss in which it sought to dismiss
the case "in order to seek prosecution for the original charge of Murder in the
First Degree." (R., Vol. II, p.300.) Before the court ruled on the state's motion,
the parties reached an agreement whereby Skogen pied guilty to voluntary
manslaughter with the state's sentencing recommendation limited to 15 years
with eight years fixed. (R., Vol. II, pp.311-312, 316-317; Tr., p.7, L.10 - p.17,
L.24.) Following a lengthy sentencing hearing, the court imposed a unified 13year sentence with four years fixed.

(R., Vol. II, pp.476-480.) Skogen filed a

Rule 35 motion, which the district court denied. (R., Vol. 11, pp.496-497; Order
filed July 18, 2011 (augmentation).)
Skogen filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., Vol. II, pp.487-489.)
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ISSUES
Skogen states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Whether the district court abused its discretion by imposing a
prison sentence based on general deterrence and
punishment alone.

2.

Whether the district court abused its discretion when it
imposed a unified sentence of thirteen years, with four years
fixed, upon Ms. Skogen following her plea of guilty to
voluntary manslaughter.

(Appellant's Brief, p.7.)

The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
1.
Should this Court decline to consider Skogen's claim that the
district court abused its discretion by imposing sentence based on general
deterrence since the claim was not raised below? Alternatively, does this Court
lack authority to override the legislature's policy determination that sentence may
be imposed based on such factors?

2.

Has Skogen failed to establish the district court abused its
discretion in imposing a 13-year sentence, with four years fixed, upon Skogen
following her guilty plea to voluntary manslaughter for the death of three-year-old
C.J.?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Skogen's Claim That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing
Sentence Based On General Deterrence Is Not Preserved; Alternatively, The
Claim Should Be Reiected

A.

Introduction
Skogen argues that "Idaho Courts should abandon the rule allowing for"

sentences based on general deterrence because, according to Skogen, "the
theory of general deterrence" is "fundamentally flawed." (Appellant's Brief, p.9.)
The Court should decline to consider this argument because it is not preserved.
Alternatively, Skogen's argument must be rejected because, although this Court
may declare a statute unconstitutional, the Court is not at liberty to instruct trial
courts to "abandon" or ignore legislative enactments.

B.

Standard Of Review
The test for determining whether a district court abused its discretion

requires an appellate court to consider three factors: "(1) whether the court
correctly perceived that the issue was one of discretion; (2) whether the court
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal
standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether it
reached its decision by an exercise of reason." State v. Hanson, --- P.3d ----,
2012 WL 29339 *3 (Idaho 2012) (quotations and citations omitted).
The appellate court exercises free review over the application and
construction of statutes.

State v. Hickman, 146 Idaho 178, 191 P.3d 1098

(2008); see also In Re Doe, 146 Idaho 277,284,192 P.3d 1101, 1108 (Ct. App.
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2008) (citing State v. Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 505, 80 P.3d 1103, 1106 (Ct. App.
2003)).

C.

The Court Should Decline To Consider Skogen's Claim That Sentence
May Not Be Imposed Based On General Deterrence Because The Claim
Is Not Preserved
Skogen's appellate claim that a sentencing court should not be allowed to

impose sentence based upon general deterrence was not presented to the
district court. 1

"Generally Idaho's appellate courts will not consider error not

preserved for appeal through an objection at trial." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,
224, 245 P.3d 961, 976 (2010). Where a claim is raised for the first time on
appeal, the appellate court will consider whether the error alleged qualifies as
fundamental error.

J.sl at 228,

245 P.3d at 980. Because Skogen did not present

her claim that it is improper to impose sentence based on deterrence and
punishment to the district court,2 and because she has failed to argue, much less

1

Although Skogen argued that, in terms of general deterrence, the public only
"knows the crime name and the sentence imposed" but does not "know the ins
and outs of the cases" such that "a sentence of probation serves the same goal
of deterrence" (Tr., p.253, L.18 - p.254, L.6), this is a vastly different argument
than the one she makes on appeal that use of general deterrence alone is
"fundamentally flawed." (Compare Appellant's Brief, pp.9-17). Moreover, as
discussed in more detail in footnote 2, contrary to her claim on appeal, Skogen
specifically acknowledged general deterrence was an appropriate factor to be
considered on appeal.
2

In fact, Skogen acknowledged at sentencing that deterrence and punishment
are factors for the court to consider in imposing sentence, but argued those
objectives, and all other sentencing objectives, were "satisfied and met with the
probation sentence and suspended prison sentence." (Tr., p.248, Ls.6-13.) In
that regard, Skogen invited the very error she claims on appeal and this Court
should decline to consider her claim for this reason as well. State v. Blake, 133
Idaho 237, 240, 985 P.2d 117, 120 ( 1999) (The purpose of the invited error
doctrine is to prevent a party who "caused or played an important role in
5

establish, fundamental error by the district court in imposing sentence based on
factors authorized by law, I.C. § 19-2521, this Court should decline to consider
this claim.

D.

Even If The Court Considers Skogen's Claim That The District Court Erred
In Imposing Sentence Based On General Deterrence, Skogen's Request
For This Court To Authorize Abandonment Of Sentencing Considerations
Authorized By Statute Must Be Reiected
Skogen

acknowledges

that

although,

under

Idaho

law,

"general

deterrence alone can justify a prison sentence," this Court should "abandon"
general deterrence as a valid sentencing factor because, she argues, "new
research reveals that not only is the theory of general deterrence fundamentally
flawed, but ... basing a punitive prison sentence on it alone actually increases
the risk to society in the future." 3 (Appellant's Brief, p.9.) Skogen also argues
that imposing punishment based on general deterrence is improper because, she

prompting a trial court" to take a particular action from "later challenging that
decision on appeal."); State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 402, 3 P.3d 67, 80 (Ct.
App. 2000) (A party is estopped, under the doctrine of invited error, from
complaining that a ruling or action of the trial court that the party invited,
consented to or acquiesced in was error; State v. Leyva, 117 Idaho 462, 465,
788 P.2d 864, 867 (Ct. App. 1990) (invited doctrine applies to sentencing
decisions as well as to rulings during trial).
3

Although Skogen's issue statement asserts error in "imposing a prison
sentence based on general deterrence and punishment alone" (Appellant's Brief,
p.7 (emphasis added)), it appears she is really only arguing that imposing a
sentence based solely on general deterrence is improper (see Appellant's Brief,
pp.10-12). However, as discussed in more detail in Section ti, infra, the court did
not impose sentence based solely on general deterrence. If anything, the court
placed more emphasis on "punishment, or retribution" than it placed on general
deterrence. (Tr., p.261, L.13 - p.262, L.9.) Thus, any assertion that the district
court focused solely on general deterrence is erroneous.
6

contends, it undermines the objective of protecting society.

(Appellant's Brief,

pp.16-18.) Skogen's arguments must be rejected.
Idaho Code § 19-2521 sets forth criteria for a tria I court to consider when
deciding whether to place a defendant on probation or impose imprisonment
That section provides, in relevant part:
(1) The court shall deal with a person who has been convicted of a
crime without imposing sentence of imprisonment unless, having
regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime and the
history, character and condition of the defendant, it is of the opinion
that imprisonment is appropriate for protection of the public
because:
(a) There is undue risk that during the period of a suspended
sentence or probation the defendant will commit another crime; or
(b) The defendant is in need of correctional treatment that can be
provided most effectively by his commitment to an institution; or
(c) A lesser sentence will depreciate the seriousness of the
defendant's crime; or
(d) Imprisonment will provide appropriate punishment and
deterrent to the defendant; or
(e) Imprisonment will provide an appropriate deterrent for
other persons in the community; or
(f) The defendant is a multiple offender or professional criminaL
LC. § 19-2521 (1 )(e) (emphasis added).
Skogen's arguments that general deterrence is a "fundamentally flawed"
sentencing consideration and punishment based on general deterrence actually
undermines the protection of society are based on articles by individuals who
essentially proffer policy reasons why punishment based on general deterrence
is ineffective and inappropriate. (Appellant's Brief, pp.10-19.) This Court is not,
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however, the body to decide whether these concerns warrant eliminating general
deterrence and punishment as factors at sentencing; that task is one for the
legislature based on policy considerations related to whether general deterrence
can be achieved by individual sentences.

See Idaho Schools for Equal

Educational Opportunity v. State, 142 Idaho 450, 460, 129 P.3d 1199, 1209
(2005) (recognizing that policy decisions are for the legislature, which decisions
are "subject to our continuing responsibility to ensure Idaho's constitutional
provisions are satisfied"); Plummer v. City of Fruitland, 140 Idaho 1, 4, 89 P.3d
841, 844 (2003) ("policy decisions are left to the legislature"); Idaho State AFLC 10 v. Leroy, 110 Idaho 691,698,718 P.2d 1129, 1136 (1986) (holding that in
the absence of a legislative invasion of constitutionally-protected rights, the
judicial branch of government must respect and defer to the legislature's
exclusive policy decisions).
Skogen's request that this Court disregard the laws passed by the
legislature on policy grounds, if preserved, should be rejected.

11.
Skogen Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion In
Imposing Sentence
A.

Introduction
Skogen argues the district court abused its discretion in imposing

sentence, asserting her sentence is excessive for several reasons:

(1) her

sentence "fails to promote" the general deterrence objective (Appellant's Brief,
p.19); (2) the sentence was vindictive if imposed solely for "retribution"
(Appellant's Brief, pp.20-21 ); (3) the district court "failed to sufficiently consider
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several mitigating circumstances" (Appellant's Brief, p.21), and (4) the district
"usurped a legislative function by creating a special class of punishments for
babysitters" (Appellant's Brief, p.34).

All of Skogen's arguments lack merit.

Application of well-established sentencing standards to the facts presented to the
district court reveals Skogen has failed to meet her heavy burden of establishing
the district court abused its discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Where the sentence imposed by a trial court is within statutory limits, the

appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion."
State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, _ , 264 P.3d 935, 941 (2011) (quotations and
citations omitted). "In deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its
view of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ." !g__,_

C.

Skogen Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion
In Imposing Sentence
"[T]he most fundamental requirement [of sentencing] is reasonableness."

Miller, 151 Idaho at _ , 264 P.3d at 941 (quotations and citation omitted).
"When reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence this Court will make an
independent examination of the record, "having regard to the nature of the
offense, the character of the offender and the protection of the public interest."
!g__,_ A review of the record demonstrates that a 13-year sentence with four years

fixed imposed for the death of a three-year-old child was more than reasonable.
Skogen has failed to establish otherwise.
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The four objectives of sentencing are well-established.

They are "(1)

protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3)
the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution."

State v.

Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 319-320, 144 P.3d 23, 24-25 (2006) (quotations and
citations omitted). "A sentence need not serve all sentencing goals; one may be
sufficient."

State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 285, 77 P.3d 956, 974 (2003)

(citing State v. Waddell, 119 Idaho 238, 241, 804 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Ct. App.
1991 )). "[G]eneral deterrence is a sufficient basis for the imposition of a period of
incarceration." State v. Robison, 119 Idaho 890, 893, 811 P.2d 500, 503 (Ct.
App. 1991) (citations omitted). Sentence may also be imposed based upon the
objective of punishment or retribution. See Sheahan, 139 Idaho at 285, 77 P.3d
at 974; see also State v. Whittle, 145 Idaho 49, 175 P.3d 211 (Ct. App. 2007)
(affirming ten-year sentence with eight years fixed on felony injury to child charge
involving death of a child and noting "[t]he offense to which [defendant] pleaded
is very grave"); State v. Sanchez, 115 Idaho 776,777, 769 P.2d 1148, 1149 (Ct.
App. 1989) ("To the extent that a minimum period of confinement represents the
judicially determined 'price' of a crime, the criteria of retribution and deterrence
are particularly important.")
In imposing sentence on Skogen, the district court considered all of the
information before it, including the preliminary hearing transcript (Tr., p.69, L.8 p.70, L.20), as well as the objectives of sentencing and stated:
Considering protection of society first, I don't believe that Ms.
Skogen would commit such an act again. There's no way to say
with all certainty, but I think Dr. Hayes's testimony that repeat of
this action by her would be remote is the likely case.
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Rehabilitation is a consideration. I think that, as [defense
counsel] stated, certainly she's in need of counseling, as we have
heard a lot of other people involved in this case certainly are as a
result of the death of [C.J.].
Deterrence is a factor. Again, I don't think it's a situation of
specific deterrence to Ms. Skogen. I think it's a factor for general
deterrence to the public to know that there are consequences to
actions that you are being held responsible for, Ms. Skogen.
That really comes down to another factor, which is
punishment. And punishment, or retribution, is an important factor
because, as I stated earlier, there is a need to hold people
accountable for their actions.
(Tr., p.261, Ls.3-23.)

On appeal, Skogen argues that "even if general deterrence is still an
acceptable objective in sentencing," her sentence is excessive because, she
asserts, it does not satisfy that objective. (Appellant's Brief, p.19 (capitalization
altered).) According to Skogen, and the article from Crimonology on which she
heavily relies, general deterrence requires the ability to "accurately predict the
certainty, severity, and swiftness of punishment."

(Appellant's Brief, p.19.)

Skogen contends her sentence "destroys the certainty of imprisonment" because
defendants in other Kootenai County cases involving the death of a child
received probation either outright or following a period of retained jurisdiction
rather than prison.

(Appellant's Brief, p.19.)

Thus, Skogen concludes,

"prospective offender[s] will not be deterred" because they will not know with
certainty whether they will go to prison. (Appellant's Brief, p.20.) This argument
is without merit. While the author of the article upon which Skogen relies may
believe that effective general deterrence requires certainty in the exact penalty
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that will be imposed (as opposed
possibility

deterrence being accomplished by the

prison), neither the Idaho legislature nor the Idaho appellate courts

have adopted this position.

Indeed, Skogen's contention that certainty in

sentencing is required is contrary to Idaho's entire discretionary sentencing
model.

Skogen's comparative sentencing argument is also contrary to Idaho

precedent rejecting such an approach. 4

As noted in State v. Pederson, 124

Idaho 179, 183, 857 P.2d 658, 662 (Ct. App. 1993), comparative sentencing is
not appropriate because: "It is well settled that not every offense in like category
calls for identical punishment; there may properly be a variation in sentences
between different offenders, depending on the circumstances of the crime and
the character of the defendant in his or her individual case." (Citations omitted.)
It is this very principle that allowed the district court to impose a sentence on
Skogen that is less than the maximum authorized by law or less than a greater
sentence imposed in a different case; presumably Skogen would prefer this to

4

Skogen also asserts "it has already been established that more lenient
sentences are appropriate in such situations," citing State v. Whittle, 145 Idaho
49, 175 P.3d 211 (Ct. App. 2007). (Appellant's Brief, p.20.) Whittle hardly
stands for the proposition that "more lenient sentences are appropriate" when a
child is killed. In fact, the Court in Whittle did not evaluate the propriety of
suspending the defendant's ten-year sentence with eight years fixed. The Court
only evaluated whether the district court abused its discretion in ordering that
sentence executed, without reduction, afterthe defendant violated her probation.
Whittle, 145 Idaho at 52, 175 P.3d at 214. If the Court in Whittle actually
"established" that any particular sentence was appropriate, it was that the fixed
eight-year sentence was, which is twice the fixed term Skogen received. Further,
an appellate determination that a sentence is not excessive does not mean that a
sentence greater than the one imposed in the case being reviewed is excessive.
Any argument otherwise is specious.
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the elimination of discretion altogether in order to advance her stated objective of
"certainty" for the benefit of effectively deterring others.
Finally, Skogen's argument, although couched as one that acknowledges
general deterrence is an "acceptable objective in sentencing," is essentially a
restatement of her argument that general deterrence should not be an objective
at all. For the reasons already stated, this argument fails.
Skogen next argues that because general deterrence is not achieved by
the sentence imposed upon her, the only "rationale remaining for a prison
sentence is retribution," "[e]rgo, it is a vengeful sentence, and is thus excessive
and was imposed in an abuse of discretion." (Appellant's Brief, pp.20-21.) This
argument fails for several reasons.

First, for the reasons set forth above, the

assertion that general deterrence is not achieved lacks merit.

Second,

punishment or retribution is a valid sentencing objective and sentence may be
imposed on this basis alone. See Sheahan, 139 Idaho at 285, 77 P.3d at 974;
Whittle, 145 Idaho 49, 175 P.3d 211; I.C. § 19-2521 (1 )(c) (imprisonment
appropriate where "[aJ lesser sentence will depreciate the seriousness of the
defendant's crime"). Third, "a vengeful sentence" is not one imposed based on
the objective of punishment and Skogen's reliance on State v. Brown, 131 Idaho
61, 72,951 P.2d 1288, 1299 (Ct. App. 1998), for such a proposition is completely
improper.

A vindictive sentence is one imposed to punish a defendant for

exercising her rights. This is the principle stated in Brown and it clearly does not
apply to this case.
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Skogen also argues that the district court abused its sentencing discretion
by

"fail[ing]

to

sufficiently

(Appellant's Brief, p.21.)

consider

several

mitigating

circumstances."

Specifically, Skogen complains that the district court

improperly "determined" that Skogen's initial lies about what happened to C.J.
"was an aggregating [sic] factor."

(Appellant's Brief, p.21.)

Skogen argues "a

sufficient consideration ... requires a sufficient consideration as to the reasons
for the reaction," which according to Skogen's psychological evaluator was the
result of Skogen's difficulty "com[ingJ to terms with the event" and her inability to
"articulate what happened and why." (Appellant's Brief, pp.21-23.) Contrary to
Skogen's claim, "sufficient consideration" does not mean the court is required to
accept her explanations for her behavior or her characterizations of evidence as
mitigating rather than aggravating. See Miller, 151 Idaho at---, 264 P.3d at 943
(implicitly approving district court's decision declining to view substance abuse
and family support as mitigating); Pizzuto v. Arave, 280 F.3d 949, 971 (9 th Cir.
2002) (quoting Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 943 (9th Cir. 1998)) (While a
sentencing judge is required to give consideration and effect to evidence
presented by the defendant, the court is not required to give particular weight to
the evidence presented by the defendant or even find it is mitigating.). Skogen's
argument that she finally told the truth about what happened once she was "able
to reconcile her actions with her perspective of her character" (Appellant's Brief,
p.25), is also contradicted by the fact that she only disclosed after being
confronted with the fact she failed her polygraph (R., Vol. I, p.33). The district
court acted well within its discretion in viewing Skogen's initial lies, and the
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related scrutiny of C.J.'s parents that resulted from those lies, 5 as a negative
factor, rather than a "mitigating" one. (Tr., p.260, Ls.1-19.)
Finally, and ironically in light of her argument that the district court erred in
considering general deterrence as a sentencing objective, Skogen argues that
the district court "usurped a legislative function by creating a special class of
punishments for babysitters." 6

(Appellant's Brief, p.34.)

This argument is

premised on the elements of voluntary manslaughter which, Skogen notes,
includes "no special provision for babysitters, or even those entrusted to care for
another's child."

(Appellant's Brief, p.35.)

The elements of voluntary

manslaughter are irrelevant to whether the court can consider Skogen's role as a
caregiver, in a position of trust, which she violated by abusing C.J.

"It is

fundamental that a sentencing court may properly conduct an inquiry broad in
scope, largely unlimited, either as to the kind of information it may consider or the
source from which it may come." State v. Leon, 142 Idaho 705, 709, 132 P .3d
462, 466 (Ct. App. 2006) (citations omitted). Skogen's relationship to C.J. at the
time she caused his death is exactly the type of information that informs a
5

Skogen also asserts that the district court's concern regarding the scrutiny of
C.J.'s parents resulting from Skogen's initial lies is a "clearly erroneous" "finding"
because she told law enforcement that she did not think C.J.'s parents were
abusive. (Appellant's Brief, pp.26-27.) This argument borders on absurd.
Skogen cannot seriously dispute that her statements that C.J. just went limp
were among the reasons C.J.'s parents were investigated for potential child
abuse when C.J. was taken to the hospital and medical personnel concluded he
had been abused. The fact that she told law enforcement that she did not think
C.J.'s parents would abuse him in no way mitigated the scrutiny they underwent
as a result of her failure to be forthcoming.
6

At sentencing, the court stated: "There's certainly an aggravating factor here in
that, Ms. Skogen, you were a baby-sitter of young [C.J.]. You were in a position
of trust, and you abused that trust." (Tr., p.259, Ls.19-22.)
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sentencing court's consideration of the objectives of sentencing, the nature of the
offense, and the character of the offender. Skogen's claim that consideration of
such information represented a usurpation of legislative authority is meritless.
The district court in this case, applying longstanding and accepted
sentencing standards, acted well within its discretion in imposing a unified 13year sentence with four years fixed upon Skogen's guilty plea to the voluntary
manslaughter of three-year-old C.J. As aptly noted by the district court, a lesser
sentence would depreciate the seriousness of the crime. (Tr., p.262, Ls.7-9.)

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment and
sentence entered upon Skogen's guilty plea to voluntary manslaughter.
DATED this 4th day of April, 2012.

JltSSI A M. LORELLO
i
D~put Attorney General
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